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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyses the global commodity circuits 
(GCCs) – value chains – for maize and tobacco in 
Zimbabwe, in the context of a reconfigured agrarian 
economy and COVID-19 induced shocks. The 
study focuses on the political economy dynamics of 
agricultural commodity circuits to reveal how they can 
contribute to understanding the drivers and constraints 
of agricultural commercialisation in Zimbabwe. The 
study was carried out in Mvurwi, a farming area in 
Mazowe district in Mashonaland Central Province, 
about 100km north-west of Harare. This paper traces 
the circuits of maize and tobacco, the two major 
crops for food security and foreign currency earnings 
in Zimbabwe. Maize is the staple food, while tobacco 
contributes to about 24 per cent of foreign currency 
earnings and 4 per cent of gross domestic product. 
However, COVID-19 induced regulations are likely 
to trigger increased illicit trade, corruption including 
fraud, theft, and pillaging along agricultural commodity 
circuits. This will likely impact on agricultural 
commercialisation and who wins and loses along the 
GCC. 
Commodity circuit analysis provides insights into 
how shifting land ownership and production patterns, 
financing, and marketing affects the periphery 
differentially across the various scales of farming. 
Measures adopted to contain COVID-19 have 
disrupted existing commodity circuits and generated 
changes in the actors and their interests in commodity 
circuits, which has fashioned new trajectories of social 
differentiation (The Economist 2020). While vaccines 
have now been developed, the impact of the initial 
lockdown on agricultural technological innovation and 
other management aspects are expected to have long-
lasting implications for commodity circuits, long after the 
pandemic is over (ibid). Along the domestic commodity 
circuits, the informal sector has been significantly 
affected, as health hygiene restrictions were imposed 
at the aggregation centres and warehouses, impacting 
on their businesses. While there has been minimal 
disruption in farm-level operations, logistical disruptions 
have resulted in food shortages and price increases. In 
the context of COVID-19, participation in commodity 
circuits may lead to the accumulation of wealth for some 
and sliding into poverty for others, predominantly with 
small-scale farmers being the losers.
While tobacco is mainly extroverted (externally 
oriented) and maize is introverted (internally oriented), 
through exports and domestic supply, respectively, 
surplus value extraction undermines farmers’ capital 
accumulation prospects. Smallholders have been the 
most affected by the COVID-19 induced disruptions 
as they now dominate in the production of both 
commodities, following the land reform in 2000. 
Tobacco is predominantly grown under contract 
farming, with 94 per cent of communal area (CA) 
farmers and 99 per cent of resettled farmers growing 
tobacco under this arrangement. The Tobacco 
Industry Marketing Board’s (TIMB) records reveal 
that at least 52.1 per cent of this tobacco is sold 
through aggregators (makoronyera). However, the data 
collected from the farms show that formal contract 
sales were far lower in 2020, at 30.3 per cent of total 
sales. This reflects the high prevalence of illicit trading, 
which begins with makoronyera at the farms through 
to the auction floors and illicit exports that are led by 
well-connected individuals. Illicit tobacco trade is most 
prevalent between Zimbabwe, as the biggest tobacco 
producer in Africa and its neighbouring countries, 
with South Africa being the most significant market. 
Similarly, for maize, 65.8 per cent is sold through 
aggregators and traders/makoronyera, while 32.1 per 
cent is delivered to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). 
The informal markets also start at the farm gate and 
end up in informal markets in Harare and other towns. 
Some informally sold maize may also shift into the 
formal channels, as makoronyera consider options 
for commodity markets. The politics of the maize 
commodity circuit begins at primary production, 
continuing all the way to processing. It is linked to 
financing for primary production and processing. 
Equally, who gets to import and distribute or secure the 
commodity for milling and eventually for retail trading is 
a political outcome.
The reconfiguration of commodity circuits due to 
COVID-19 induced disruptions of the transport 
system and other logistics systems, including the 
closure of aggregation centres and warehouses, has 
affected market access. Access to seeds and other 
imported inputs was made more difficult by the need 
for foreign currency, in a context where the trade of 
farm commodities is in local Zimbabwean dollars. 
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Farmers considered this trade matrix unviable, due to 
the ballooning foreign exchange rate. Some farmers 
suggest the decentralisation of the marketing system in 
which tobacco auction floors were established in other 
towns besides Harare, made it difficult for makoronyera 
in Harare to collude with buyers to manipulate the 
prices. The opposite applies for maize, where higher 
deliveries by vulnerable growers facing cash shortages 
under the weight of COVID-19, were being forced to 
sell at far lower prices and to fewer local makoronyera. 
While the GMB has introduced an early maize delivery 
incentive and relaxed moisture content requirements, 
prices have remained low and unfavourable to farmers.
The GCCs are politically mediated. In the maize 
circuits, access to Command Agriculture is mediated 
by ‘a coalition of political actors’ within the ruling party 
in government and within the military, who distribute 
rents to preferred groups of farmers. The tobacco 
circuits promote direct linkages between international 
contractors and growers of different scales. This limits 
the role of the state and patronage. However, the rise of 
makoronyera in the marketing process and, ultimately, 
the illicit export of tobacco connected to ‘a coalition of 
political actors’, undermine the growers and promote 
illicit capital accumulation by a few ‘untouchables’.
Under the weight of patriarchal practices, and more 
recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, women remain 
excluded from state sponsored farmer support 
programmes, such as Command Agriculture. However, 
the youth are faring well compared to other age groups. 
In comparison to farmers and farm workers who 
lack voices, processing associations are politically 
connected and control both the formal and informal 
markets, including illicit makoronyera trading, across 
borders and at the retail level. Makoronyera thrive in 
an environment where the rule of law is in doubt and 
law enforcement mechanisms are weak. In this sense, 
the need for government to ensure the eradication of 
impunity and provide an enabling macro-economic 
environment for sustainable commodity circuits cannot 
be over-emphasised.
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This paper analyses the global commodity circuits 
(GCCs) for maize and tobacco in the context of a 
reconfigured agrarian economy and COVID-19 induced 
shocks in Zimbabwe. Commodity circuit analysis 
provides insights into how shifting land ownership and 
crop production patterns, financing, and marketing 
affect the periphery differentially across the various 
scales of farming. Unlike traditional methods of 
economic and social enquiry, value chain analysis’ 
focus on the inter-linkages within the productive sector 
and the global interaction of countries, firms, and 
individuals, provides a broader and more nuanced 
analysis. Such an analysis can reveal who wins and who 
loses in the production and distribution of commodities 
and services (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011). 
Measures adopted to contain COVID-19 in 2020 
disrupted existing commodity circuits, which 
generated changes in the actors and their interests 
in commodity circuits, fashioning new trajectories 
of social differentiation (The Economist 2020). While 
vaccines have now been developed, the impact of the 
initial lockdown on agricultural technological innovation 
and other management aspects are expected to have 
long-lasting implications for commodity circuits long 
after the pandemic is over (ibid). The informal sector has 
been affected as health hygiene restrictions imposed 
at aggregation centres and warehouses constrained 
the movement of producers and goods. While there 
has been minimal disruption to farm-level operations, 
logistical disruptions curtailed the transportation of 
commodities from the farms, resulting in food shortages 
and price increases. It is hypothesised that these 
challenges and risks sustain entangled accumulation 
(Gonçalves and Costa 2020) in which surplus value 
extraction is sustained and reconfigure political power 
dynamics along the commodity circuits, impacting on 
agricultural commercialisation in Zimbabwe.
As Poulton and Chinsinga (2018) argue, national 
policies may affect land tenure in ways that may impact 
production patterns and commodity value chains. While 
reversing the skewed land ownership patterns from 
1 Moyo (2011) proposed the emergence of a tri-modal agrarian structure in which the peasantry (A1 farmers and 
CA farmers), middle-scale farmers (A2 farmers and SSCFs), and the remaining agro-estates dominate, following 
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000.
2000, Zimbabwe's dramatic Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme (FTLRP) also broadened smallholder 
farmers' (SHFs) participation in commodity production. 
Since the early 1980s, the land reform programmes have 
transferred 10 million ha (Moyo 2011) and added 140,000 
households to an existing total of 1.7 million smallholder 
producers in the communal and old resettlement areas 
(Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). The new tri-modal 
agrarian structure introduced after 2000 includes 8,000 
small-scale commercial farmers (SSCFs) and about 
300 remaining large-scale commercial farms (LSCFs).1 
Besides altering landholding patterns, the emergent 
land tenure comprises less than 10,000 farms owned 
by the SSCF, LSCF, and indigenous commercial farmers 
under the private freehold tenure. This is down from 
15,000 in 2000. Additionally, over 25,000 plots are now 
held under long-term leases, up from 3,000 in 2000. 
The number of households owning land under land 
grants and permits expanded from 100,000 in 2000 to 
215,000 by 2012. There has also been a simultaneous 
shift among tobacco producers from LSCFs to SHFs. 
The SHFs' share of total maize production increased 
from 53.6 per cent in 1980 to 72.6 per cent by 2011, and 
to 74.1 per cent by 2017. Similarly, SHF's contribution 
to tobacco production rose from below 15 per cent in 
1980 to 40 per cent in 2011 and 68.1 per cent in 2017 
(MLAWCRR 2017).
This land reform process also coincided with the 
imposition of sanctions by European Union and the 
US, which triggered capital flight (Moyo and Nyoni 
2013; Scoones et al. 2010), resulting in foreign currency 
shortages and the disruption of farm input commodity 
circuits, while altering the demand and scale of 
operations along the circuits. The sanctions also 
caused the closure of European markets for horticultural 
and beef produce and altered tobacco and maize 
commodity circuits. Although Zimbabwe produces 
16 agricultural commodities, including beef and dairy 
products (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012), maize 
and tobacco are the major crops for food security and 
foreign currency earnings. Maize is the staple food in 
Zimbabwe and tobacco contributes to about 24 per 
1 INTRODUCTION
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cent of foreign currency earnings, as well as 4 per cent 
of the gross domestic product (TIMB 2015).
The GCCs are also known as global value chains 
(GVCs) and were defined by Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon (2005) as the globally dispersed networks 
of firms and other institutional actors that coordinate 
to produce given goods or services for consumption. 
The GCC is the neoclassical version of the former, 
however, they both originate from the world systems 
approach introduced by Wallerstein (1974). This theory, 
which traces the development of the modern world, 
emphasises the social structure of global inequality 
that holds up the skewed commodity trade. The paper 
adopts a radical political economy approach (Cousins 
and Scoones 2010) to examine the dialectic of 
production and the circulation of historical materialism 
(De Janvry 1981), and understand how the land reform 
and the COVID-19 pandemic impact on the national 
economy. The paper analyses how exploitative 
structures that undermine smallholders' agrarian 
accumulation are shaping who wins and loses within 
the value chain. The use of GCCs rather than GVCs – a 
rather liberal term – fits the approach. 
Tobacco is an extroverted (externally oriented) 
crop with geographically dispersed production 
and processing (Goger, Bamber and Gareffi 2014). 
Zimbabwe exports over 97 per cent of its tobacco 
as semi-processed to various destinations for further 
processing and the manufacturing of cigarettes and 
other tobacco products. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has 
barely produced sufficient quantities of maize to meet 
local demand and has often had to import maize 
from various countries. Thus, maize is an introverted 
crop (internally oriented), mostly consumed locally. 
Along these global and domestic commodity circuits, 
SHFs have immensely suffered from surplus labour 
extraction, the exportation of surplus value, and the 
loss of employment opportunities, as they are situated 
in the low value segments of the GCCs. Shifts in 
production and circulation of the two commodities 
were also observed at the financing level. For instance, 
the rise in contract farming and the introduction 
of Command Agriculture2 impacted the marketing 
channels for tobacco and maize, respectively (Shonhe 
and Mtapuri 2020; Mazwi et al. 2019; Scoones et al. 
2018). The changes in commodity circuits bear political 
significance in the intra-party politics of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and 
inter-party politics, as they have an influence on who 
2 Command Agriculture is a government mediated contract farming system for food crops, such as maize, 
soya beans, and sugar beans. It is run through funding channelled by the government to the Central Bank of 
Zimbabwe, Stanbic Bank and Agribank. A stop order system administered by the GMB provides the mechanism 
to recoup the costs of seed, fertilisers, chemicals, tillage, and labour advanced to farmers under the scheme.
wins and losses in accumulation (Scoones 2015) and 
political power (Shonhe and Scoones, unpublished; 
Shonhe and Mtapuri 2020).
How then have power structures and actors' 
interests along the commodity circuits changed over 
time? How has politics affected participation in the 
commodity circuits? How has commercialisation 
or changes in its pathways influenced different 
outcomes and impacts for different groups in the long 
term? What changes have resulted within the context 
of the emergence of COVID-19? The FTLRP resulted 
in social differentiation based on new land ownership 
patterns (Moyo 2011). The adverse incorporation of 
farmers in GCCs results in primitive accumulation, 
where surplus value is extracted and exported to 
developed countries through mispricing, interest, 
and profits (Shonhe 2018; Shonhe 2020). This further 
entrenches social differentiation (Scoones et al. 2018) 
and class formation (Shonhe and Mtapuri 2020).
Following Wallerstein's (1974) world systems theory, 
Luxemburg (2015 [1913], 432) argues that through 
primitive accumulation, the internal circuit receives limited 
surplus value. For Fontes (2017), as Gonçalves and 
Costa (2020, 155) cite, the ‘expansion of capitalism never 
occurred in the form of a fully normalized accumulation, 
but rather was always grounded in speculation, pillage, 
fraud and blatant theft’. This expropriation may be 
supported through political regulatory interventions 
(Gonçalves and Costa 2020), such as the restrictions on 
movement imposed under the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
disarticulation of the primary and secondary processes 
of production and circulation leads to what Gonçalves 
and Costa (2020) describe as entangled accumulation. 
It is argued therefore that entangled accumulation is 
ongoing and continuous.
In this sense, the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered 
the imposition of regulations (IFPRI 2020), has the scope 
to result in the ‘rapid disarticulation of the production, 
processing, distribution, and consumption of food’, 
disrupting global food systems and further exposing 
the weaknesses of the commodity circuits (van der 
Ploeg 2020, 1-2). State lockdown regulations de-
activate the economy (van der Ploeg 2020) and trigger 
shortages and shifts in supply chains, which impact 
surplus value extraction. Arguably, COVID-19 induced 
regulations are likely to trigger illicit trade, corruption, 
including fraud, theft, and pillaging, perpetuating 
entangled accumulation. It is conceivable that GCCs 
are being manipulated to meet political settlements, or 
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that variations in geographical factors may influence 
the circulation of commodities at the domestic or 
global scale (Poulton and Chinsinga 2018). Within this 
contestation, participation in commodity circuits may 
lead to the deepening of entangled accumulation, 
where some will win, while others slide into poverty, 
mainly the small-scale farmers.
With farmers involved in GCCs that are skewed in favour 
of the importing countries in the centre, tendencies 
for social differentiation are conceivable. This calls for 
an examination of the ‘complexity of interactions of 
multiple forms of social categories, including gender, 
age, class, religion, sexuality and ethnicity, in shaping 
social structures and matrices of inequality and 
oppression’ as intersectionality theorists argue (Dancer 
and Hossain 2018). The use of a political economy 
lens, as adopted in this paper, allows for an analysis 
of the interplay of social structures, the patriarchy, and 
global capitalism (ibid). 
This paper uses documentary analysis of secondary 
data sources, including official statistics from 
government departments, key informant interviews 
(KIIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs). Following 
this introduction, section 2 discusses the methods and 
data analysis, while the next section (3) maps out the 
evolution of the maize and tobacco commodity circuits, 
assessing their changes over time. The structure of 
commodity circuits is presented in section 4. COVID-19 
instigated changes in commodity marketing patterns in 
Mvurwi are discussed in section 5. In section 6, social 
differentiation emanating from policy contestation 
and the politics of commodity circuits are introduced, 
followed by a discussion in section 7. A conclusion is 
offered in section 8.
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The study was carried out in Mvurwi, a farming area 
in Mazowe district, in Mashonaland Central Province, 
about 100km north-west of Harare, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. It is situated in the high potential agro-
ecological region that receives an average of 800mm 
of rainfall annually.
The FTLRP resulted in the resettlement of 4,529 
A1 (small-scale) farmers and 319 A2 (middle-scale) 
farmers, who added to the pre-existing 2,709 CA 
households in Mvurwi, creating a tri-modal agrarian 
structure. Twelve KIIs were administered in Harare at 
the tobacco auction floors, with directors of processing 
companies, and with directors in government 
departments in Harare. These included informants 
from TIMB, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), 
food processing companies, tobacco processing 
companies, bankers, agricultural researchers and 
extension officers, tobacco merchants, agricultural 
input suppliers, and cigarette manufacturers. A total of 
six FGDs were also administered, two in each of the 
land-use areas (A2, A1, and CA). Document analysis of 
data secured from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization’s database, Zimstats 
annual survey reports, a report from the GMB, the 
Department of Agriculture Extension Services in 
Mvurwi, and Concession town was carried out to 
triangulate the data.
2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS
Figure 2.1: Mvurwi study area
Source: APRA study, 2019
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This section maps out the changing commodity 
production for maize and tobacco over time. In the 
main, these changes were associated and driven by 
the radical FTLRP and the changing financing and 
marketing options after 2000. These changes were 
also stirred by changes in the broader economy and 
geopolitics, especially in the case of tobacco. While the 
maize circuit is mostly introvert, serving the domestic 
market, the tobacco circuit is global and therefore 
extrovert. The government of Zimbabwe traditionally 
works with the TIMB and GMB in formulating tobacco 
and maize farming and marketing policies. These 
policies include the Tobacco Marketing and Levy Act 
(Chapter 18.20) (Chitongo 2017; TRB 2017) and the 
Grain Marketing Act (1957), through which the GMB 
is administered. This section discusses the production 
and circulation of the crops in the context of changing 
actors and policies, mainly after 2000.
3.1 Maize production
After four decades of land reform, commodity production 
in Zimbabwe has radically shifted, and so have the 
output markets. In Zimbabwe, grain crops and food 
staples account for over half of Zimbabwe's cultivated 
land area and overall agricultural output, and maize 
stands out as the most important grain crop, being both 
a staple food for the majority and a significant feed grain 
(Kapuya et al. 2010:10). It can be consumed as raw grain 
or processed into maize meal (Kapuya and Sihlobo 
2014), as well as a variety of other food and industrial 
products including starch, sweeteners, oil, beverages, 
glue, industrial alcohol, and ethanol fuel (Ranum, 
Peña‐Rosas, and Garcia‐Casal 2014:105). There was a 
slowing down in maize production from the 1990s to 
2002 (Pazvakavambwa 2009; Mudimu 2003), see Figure 
3.1. The decline was as a result of the FTLRP (Mlambo 
2005; Hammar and Raftopolous 2003). Thus, incessant 
droughts, the FTLRP-induced economic sanctions, 
and disruptions to farming operations resulted in a 
transitional decline in output over this period (Moyo et al. 
2011; Scoones et al. 2010). 
A decline in bank credit and shortages in farm inputs 
resulted in a drop in maize output from 2001 to 2004, 
according to Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo (2012). Still, 
a shift from cash to food crops accounts for increases 
in maize output by resettled farmers, as was the case 
from 2005 (Figure 3.1). As Figure 3.1 shows, there 
was a further sustained decline in maize production 
between 2010 and 2016, which was reversed partly 
by the re-introduction of Command Agriculture by the 
government in 2016. Resettled farmers, who were 
responsible for the shift from cash to food crops, 
3 MAPPING MAIZE AND TOBACCO 
COMMODITY CIRCUITS 
Figure 3.1: Maize output, 1993–2017
Source: Author’s own, compiled using figures obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and 
Irrigation Development database (2017)
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received support from the government’s Command 
Agriculture, resulting in increased production.
The production of maize is highest in the wetter 
provinces in Mashonaland and Manicaland, located 
in the east and north-west of Zimbabwe, respectively. 
The reconfiguration of the agrarian structure, following 
the land reform, altered maize production patterns. 
Production shifted from LSCF production to SHFs 
resettled after 1980 and to the CAs that had begun 
producing maize during the colonial period. During the 
1970s, about 5,000–6,000 LSCFs accounted for over 
90 per cent of the maize delivered to the formal sector 
markets, and about 750,000 SHFs (in the Tribal Trust 
Lands) produced about 5 per cent. In comparison, 
about 8,000 SSCFs accounted for the remaining 5 
per cent (Rohrbach 1989:2–3). During the early 1980s, 
resettlement increased the number of farmers and 
expanded the cultivated area in Zimbabwe. Between 
1979 and 1985, cereal production in Zimbabwe 
increased by about 80 per cent, with maize production 
more than doubling. Fifty per cent of this increase in 
maize production was attributable to black smallholder 
production (Rohrbach 1989:2). A welfarist pro-peasant 
agricultural policy introduced by the new government 
of the ZANU PF resulted in a boom in maize production 
in the first decade after independence. The was 
accompanied by the opening up of more GMB depots 
to buy the crop from farmers, creating a ready and 
accessible market for maize.
As Figure 3.2 shows, CA farmers, alongside LSCFs 
and SSCFs, led the production of maize up until 
3 KII, PD, 2020
2002. From 2004, SHFs accounted for the highest 
proportion of maize produced in Zimbabwe, in line 
with the tri-modal agrarian structure and government 
welfarist policies.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that middle-scale farmers 
(A2) received the most support, they contributed less in 
maize output than SHFs (Shonhe 2018; Scoones et al. 
2010), as deliveries to the GMB revealed.3
3.2 Tobacco production
Tobacco has been central to economic development 
and politics in Zimbabwe in the pre-and-post colonial 
period (Mbanga 1991). The national reconciliation 
policy introduced in 1980 led to a reversal of the drop 
in production associated with political uncertainties 
experienced at the time, as shown in Figure 3.3. The 
policy advocated for the non-adversarial co-existence 
of white colonisers and the black majority, which gave 
the white farmers confidence to continue investing in 
agriculture. Annual tobacco production was, therefore, 
on the rise and reached 237 million kg by 2000 (TIMB 
2000). However, the land reform of 2000 eventually led 
to a drastic drop in annual tobacco production to 48 
million kg by 2008 (TIMB 2018).
A new wave of rising tobacco production, driven by 
the newly resettled farmers, was experienced under 
the Government of National Unity (GNU) from 2009. 
The GNU liberalised agricultural commodity marketing 
and introduced the foreign currency retention policy 
for tobacco sales, which triggered a resurgence in 
Figure 3.2: Maize output by sector, 1994–2017
Notes: ORA refers to the old resettlement area
Source: Author’s own, compiled using figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation 
Development, Second Round Crop and Livestock Assessment (2017)
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tobacco production and other commodities (Moyo et 
al. 2014; Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). This new 
wave was characterised by the broader participation 
of farmers, dominated by smallholders in the CA and 
A1 sectors (Figure 3.4). Under the Look East policy 
developed in 2003, the China National Tobacco 
Corporation (CNTC) – a state-owned monopoly 
and the world's largest tobacco companies, Tian Ze 
Tobacco Company’s (TZTC), subsidiary – oversaw the 
resurgence in contract farming and spurred growth in 
production from 2005 (Fang et al. 2020).
By 2020, 95.3 per cent of tobacco producers were 
growing under contract farming, supported by 36 
tobacco merchants and delivering 95.5 per cent of 
total tobacco crop production (TIMB 2020). In this 
context, the production of a crop, which generates 24 
per cent of the foreign currency in Zimbabwe, could 
now be produced by a broader mass of SHFs, who 
now accumulate from below. As a result, these sectors 
have increased their participation in the production 
of tobacco and its commodity circuit. For instance, 
LSCFs, which produced 94.5 per cent of tobacco in 
2000, have been replaced by A1 farmers, who now 
contribute 27 per cent of total tobacco production. The 
CA farmers contribute 38 per cent, while A2 farmers 
contribute 27 per cent of total tobacco production, as 
shown in Table 3.1.
The SSCFs' contribution to total tobacco production 
rose to 8 per cent by 2017, after contributing next to 
nil in 2000. The land reform, therefore, shifted tobacco 
production from large-scale commercial farmers to 
small-scale commercial farmers. Access to tobacco 
Figure 3.3: National tobacco output, 1975–2017
Source: Author’s own, based on TIMB (2017) 
Figure 3.4: Sectional tobacco output per sector, 1993–2017
Source: Author’s own, compiled using the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development, 
Second Round Crop and Livestock Assessment (2017)
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contract farming is broad, covering the A1 and CA 
farmers who have no bankable security. Tobacco 
growers are registered by the TIMB annually. Through 
this register, a stop order facility is used to manage 
growers' obligations to the state, as well as the contract 
farming system, where advanced amounts through 
banks or the contract farming system are deducted. 
Overall, the contract prices have been higher than those 
offered at the independent auction floors, such that 
some farmers who produce independently often sell 
under contract arrangements. Through the Tobacco 
Research Act (Chapter 28:21), the Tobacco Research 
Board (TRB) controls the production of tobacco seed 
and the regulation of chemicals used in the industry 
(Muroiwa, Mushunje and Musitini 2019; TRB 2017). 
These institutional arrangements have a bearing on 
the production and marketing of the two crops, as we 
discuss in the sections to follow.
Table 3.1: Week 53 mass deliveries by contract and non-contract farmers per farming model
Type of funding  A1  A2  CAs  SSCFs 2020 2019 Variance 
Non-contracted (kg) 2,099,388 514,042 3,316,481 375,383 6,305,294 21,489,282 -71
Contracted (kg) 36124709 37420323.6 48973944.89 10281614 132,800,591 135,726,469 -2
Total crop (kg) 38,224,097 37,934,366 52,290,426 10,656,997 139,105,885 157,215,751 -12
Percentage of 2020 
total (%)




95 99 94 96 95
Source: Author’s own, computed from TIMB (2020)
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4 COMMODITY CIRCULATION: FROM 
MVURWI TO THE GLOBAL MARKETS
Having discussed the changes in production patterns, 
to give context as to how the input and output markets 
are configured, this section turns to the rest of the 
commodity circuits, as elaborated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
4.1 Maize input and output markets
Figure 4.1 illustrates the maize commodity circuit. Given 
the limited financing options in post-FTLRP Zimbabwe 
(Moyo et al. 2014; Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012) 
farmers rely on the reinvestment of agrarian surplus 
(Shonhe 2019b), remittances (Scoones et al. 2010) 
and public contract farming – particularly Command 
Agriculture – and the Presidential Well Wishers Inputs 
Scheme. A2 farmers are mostly supported through the 
Command Agriculture programme as they are politically 
connected (Shonhe and Scoones unpublished). A2 
farmers are comprised of bureaucrats and members 
of the military, who are also the gatekeepers of the 
programme, notwithstanding the logistical role played 
by the GMB. The presidential Well Wishers Input 
Scheme targets smallholders in the CAs and the 
A1 sector, providing maize crop inputs to farmers, 
sufficient only to meet subsistence production. Party 
leaders and traditional leaders work together in 
selecting beneficiaries. In most cases, those aligned 
to the ruling party tend to benefit, as state capacity 
is inadequate to support all farmers. Shonhe (2018) 
observed that the support  increased during electoral 
periods, as was the case in 2005, 2008 and 2013. 
However, the Command Agriculture programme and 
the Well Wishers Input Scheme do not provide sufficient 
inputs to the farmers as the demand is higher than the 
government supply. A female A2 farmeradvised:
We sell our maize crop to the GMB so that we 
get inputs the following [season], but the support 
is never adequate for our needs. We now resort 
to horticulture to generate funds to support our 
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maize and tobacco production and the rest of our 
farming. We also use the money to buy pipes and 
pumps for irrigation and to pay workers.4
Thus, while the sources of fertilisers, seed, and 
chemicals are aligned to the aforementioned financing 
arrangements, most farmers also access farming 
inputs from local agri-traders in the nearest towns, 
relying on their sales income to purchase these inputs 
(Shonhe 2017; Moyo et al. 2014). Unlike in the pre-
2000 period, where agricultural inputs were bought 
from big companies, small agri-traders now dominate 
in this area.5  Accompanying the FTLRP, changes were 
also experienced in the input supply chain, with the 
emergence of small traders who joined to compete 
with the big players. However, of the ten leading 
producers of seed maize, the most prominent are 
Seed Co Zimbabwe (a Zimbabwean company formed 
in 1983), Pannar (a South African company established 
in 1958), Agriseeds (Zimbabwean company), ARDA 
Seeds (state-owned by the Zimbabwean government), 
the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development 
Centre (locally-owned, established in 1986), and 
Pioneer Hi-Bred (an American company).
The purchase of seeds from South Africa is also typical 
across other commodities, including horticultural 
seeds. South African companies, such as Avanos 
and Charter seeds, are the main suppliers as they are 
perceived as cheaper. Besides, the use of retained and 
open-pollinated maize seed by Zimbabwean SHFs is 
increasing, owing to the high prices of marketed maize 
seed (Tibugari et al. 2019; World Bank 2015). The 
circuits for accessing fertiliser, chemicals, and farming 
machinery are similar to those identified for tobacco 
crop, illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
The GMB is responsible for food security and has 
responsibility for buying and selling grain commodities 
in the country, controlling grain handling, storage, 
and processing facilities, and maintaining the national 
strategic grain reserve (Pazvakavambwa 2009). To 
this extent, the GMB currently enjoys a pervasive 
monopoly over the grain industry, even though this 
has intermittently shifted over time as state policy 
changes. For instance, between March and July 2020, 
monetary and exchange control regulations changed 
a record 12 times, affecting the pricing structure for 
tobacco and maize prices. The GMB buys a variety 
of crops from farmers and sells them to the domestic 
agro-processing industry. It also exports agricultural 
products to regional and international markets when 
4 Interview with Mrs DN, Mvurwi, 2 February 2020
5 Interview with A1 farmer, DK, in Mvurwi in March 2020
6 Interview with GV, Mvurwi, Hariana farm, 20 February 2020
7 ibid
there is excess supply, while importing agricultural 
commodities when they are in short supply locally. 
The marketing of maize has reconfigured significantly 
since 2000, while maize processing has equally 
evolved. These changes were observed during the 
FGDs in Chiweshe, in Mvurwi: ‘The markets for maize 
rapidly changes, along with government policies 
and demand from various buyers’6. For instance, the 
government often directed that all maize sales be 
carried out through the GMB, as has been the case 
during periods and years of short supply, but informal 
sales also continued to take place. The GMB, which 
was previously only involved in buying and selling the 
grain, is now processing mealie meal through Silo, 
its subsidiary, formed after 2000. The makoronyera, 
dominant in tobacco marketing, are also common in 
maize marketing. They also include Mbare – Musika 
buyers in Harare. As such, 65.8 per cent of grain maize 
is sold through aggregators and traders/makoronyera, 
while 32.1 per cent is delivered to the GMB.
The GMB pays farmers in the local currency and 
there is often a delay in payment after delivery of the 
commodity to the depots. Farmers therefore tend to 
prefer selling to makoronyera because they promptly 
pay in US dollars. Farmers complain that the foreign 
exchange regime affects their bottom line, given 
the current distortions. For instance, an A1 farmer7 
indicated that:
This year, 2020, the GMB is buying at Z$12,000 
and giving an incentive of 30 per cent for early 
delivery, increasing the price to Z$16,000 per 
t, which translates to US$100 and US$133 per t 
respectively, the current informal exchange rate of 
US$1:Z$120. However, makoronyera are paying 
between US$230 and US$280 per t, making this a 
preferred market choice.
The 2020/21 producer price for maize was pegged at 
Z$32,000 per t, which will likely cause distortions in the 
production of maize (Chulu 2020). While the price is 
an improvement from the previous seasons, there are 
concerns that it was announced late after farmers had 
already made concrete plans for the season. Moreover, 
these maize prices are well above the regional level, 
which may result in connected individuals getting 
involved in illegal exports at exorbitant margins. Chulu 
(2020: 12) observed that:
The maize guaranteed producer price is US$400 
per tonne at the forex auction rate or US$320 per 
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tonne at the unofficial exchange rate. In South 
Africa, the export parity price for maize is the 
equivalent of US$150 per tonne. The world maize 
price is currently US$155 per tonne. The world 
maize price is projected to rise to US$160 per 
tonne. This means our guaranteed maize producer 
price is between 2.1–2.7 times the import parity 
price… With corruption rife, the producer price 
has likely created a honeypot for get-rich-quick 
schemes. History is likely to repeat itself.
While most maize was resold to households in urban 
areas, after 2000, an emerging market was the small 
grain millers, who bought directly from farmers and 
the GMB.8 During 2020, the Grain Millers Association 
of Zimbabwe (GMAZ) was involved in the moderation 
of maize supply to millers. Due to inadequate supply 
from farmers in some years, the GMAZ was assigned 
the responsibility of importing maize into the country.9 
This is a lucrative business as it involves enormous 
sums of money.10 The GMAZ has been accused of 
patronage and corruption in securing scarce foreign 
currency from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
and in the allocation of grain to millers (Chibamu 
2020). There are also allegations that ‘some millers 
were getting maize allocations from GMB beyond 
their plant capacities and would offload the excess 
on the black market’ (Murwira and Muchedzi 2020), 
after being offered the commodity at subsidised 
prices. The actors given the licence to import maize 
and allocate grain to millers, including those given 
access to RBZ foreign currency allocations at this 
stage of the commodity circuits, is a matter of both 
political connections and patronage. There are fears 
that connected individuals will escalate this practice 
as maize prices are grossly distorted. These fears are 
worsened by emerging evidence revealing that despite 
existing shortages, maize is being exported to Zambia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo through illegal 
means (Maverick Citizen 2021; Frykberg 2019).
The politics of the maize commodity circuit is linked 
to the financing of primary production and processing. 
Equally, the actors allocated the commodity for milling 
and eventually for retail trading is a political outcome 
(Poulton and Chinsinga 2018). In 2020, the GMB was 
selling to millers at subsidised prices, even though not 
all millers benefited. In Malawi, Chinsinga and Poulton 
(2014: 145) observed that the use of subsidies was 
‘plagued by elite capture and political manipulation’ to 
gain and maintain political control and support (Banful 
8 Interview with a grain miller, VR, in Harare, May 2020
9 Interview with GMAZ official, May 2020
10 For example, the Zimbabwean parliament carried out a public hearing to establish how GMAZ used US$28.2 
million allocated to it by the RBZ in 2017 (Chibamu 2020)
2011). In Zimbabwe, the military, which is involved in 
the Command Agriculture programme, and individuals 
with close connections to the ruling elites are observed 
to be benefiting from GMB subsidies. Those benefiting 
are either middle-scale farmers or elite in the GMAZ, 
who are connected to ruling ZANU-PF. The middle-
scale farmers and GMAZ hold sway in national policy 
making in various ways. For example, the middle-scale 
farmers control political support at the local level, which 
is mobilised for electoral victory during elections. The 
GMAZ controls rents through the distribution of grain 
to small grain millers, after importing or buying grain 
from the GMB, at concessionary prices.
4.2 Tobacco input and output markets
The input markets for tobacco production are 
intricately linked to the output marketing circuits under 
the funding arrangements, where contract farming 
and self-financing dominate. Contract farming refers 
to the ‘relations between growers and private or state 
enterprises that substitute for open-market exchanges 
by linking nominally independent family farmers of 
widely variant assets with a central processing, export, 
or purchasing unit that regulates in advance price, 
production practices, product quality, and credit’ 
(Watts 1994: 26–27). 
Contracted farmers sell through merchant floors as 
prescribed in the contract agreement. Self-financed 
farmers can choose to sell through independent 
floors or merchant floors. Tobacco is predominantly 
grown under contract farming arrangements, with 94 
per cent of CA farmers and 99 per cent of resettled 
farmers producing tobacco under such arrangements. 
As TIMB records show, at least 52.1 per cent of 
contracted tobacco is sold through aggregators and 
traders (makoronyera). Data collected from the farmers 
for this study shows that formal contract sales were 
far lower in 2020, at 30.3 per cent of total sales. This 
indicates the prevalence of illicit trade, which begins 
with makoronyera in the fields and at auction floors 
and is led by well-connected individuals involved 
in illegal cross border trade. Illicit trade is most 
prevalent between Zimbabwe, as the biggest tobacco 
producer in Africa, and its neighbouring countries, with 
South Africa being the most significant market. The 
ascendance of makoronyera – who offer to buy the 
crop at various stages (reaping, curing, grading, and 
marketing) – paying the full value in US dollars, has 
been on the rise since 2016. In the past, makoronyera 
have also been accused of manipulating the auction 
processes in collusion with buyers at the auction floors 
in Harare. A tobacco contractor observed that:
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Given the liquidity challenges in Zimbabwe, 
contract farming remains the only way to finance 
agriculture. We run a contract floor for the 
contracted farmers. We also have a structure of 
50 extension officials with ten supervisors and four 
managers, who are mobile and available to assist 
the farmers. They use motorcycles and cars and 
can therefore quickly move from one farm to the 
other. We get off-shore loans from buyers who are 
overseas to finance buying of the tobacco leaf. The 
RBZ provides operating loans. However, we face 
the challenge of side-marketing where farmers end 
up selling to other buyers who go to the farms, 
clandestinely. These end up selling the tobacco to 
other contractors to our disadvantage.11
Contracted farmers are provided with ‘fertilisers, 
pesticides and herbicides, wage finance support and 
extension services’,12  though this differs from company 
to company. In 2020, Zimbabwe had 36 tobacco 
merchants, seven of which were of foreign origin. These 
were Tian Ze from China; Zimbabwe Leaf Tobacco and 
Mashonaland Tobacco Company (MTC) from the US; 
Northern Tobacco (NT), which has local connections 
and links with the United Kingdom; Curverid Tobacco 
P/L from Russia; and Intercontinental Leaf Tobacco 
Company and Premium Leaf Zimbabwe from the United 
Arab Emirates. In 2020, the top four companies (MTC, 
NT, Premium Leaf Zimbabwe, and Tian Ze) had bought 
11 Interview with a tobacco contractor, SF, in Harare, June 2020
12 Interview with an A1 farmer, RP, in Mvurwi, February 2020
58.2 per cent of the contracted crop by day 53 of the 
marketing season. At the global level, Alliance One 
International and Universal Corporation control 40–60 
per cent of the market. In fact, the top five multinational 
corporations control 80 per cent of the industry 
market (Goger, Bamber, and Gareffi 2014). Some of 
these companies have subsidiaries in Zimbabwe, for 
instance, Mashonaland Tobacco Company (Pvt.) Ltd 
is a subsidiary of Alliance One International. There 
are three independent tobacco auction floors – the 
Tobacco Sales Floor (TSF), Boka Tobacco Floor (BTF), 
and the Premier Tobacco Floor (PTF) – where tobacco 
grown by independent growers is marketed.
The two suppliers of tobacco seed are the Zimbabwe 
Tobacco Seed Association (ZTSA) (accounting for 31.2 
per cent of the market) and Kutsaga, of the TRB (which 
makes up the remaining 68.8 per cent). In the fertiliser 
industry, Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company Pvt Ltd (ZFC) 
and Windmill lead in the supply of fertilisers to growers 
under independent and contract arrangements. 
However, much more fertiliser is imported from outside 
the country, mainly from South Africa, compared to the 
quantities used from local production. The chemical 
industry supply line is more comprehensive and so 
are the distribution channels. Cropserve, Superfert, 
Omnia, CP Chemicals, Windmill, Agricura, Bayer, and 
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ZFC are common in over 20 companies involved in 
fertiliser supply (TRB, 2020).
Over 98 per cent of tobacco crop is marketed in 
primary/semi-processed form, while the balance is 
used for the manufacturing of cigarettes and other 
tobacco products. China accounts for 47 per cent 
of Zimbabwe’s tobacco exports, followed by Africa, 
mainly South Africa, (24 per cent) and the European 
Union (13 per cent). The Middle East accounts for 10 
per cent of Zimabwe’s tobacco exports, while the rest 
of Europe took the balance of 5 per cent in 2018. There 
are three tobacco processing companies in Zimbabwe. 
Tobacco Processors Zimbabwe processes 42 per cent 
of the tobacco processed in Zimbabwe and employs 
1,800 seasonal workers, in addition to 148 permanent 
workers. The remaining 58 per cent is processed by 
Mashonaland Tobacco and Zimbabwe Leaf Tobacco.
There are also three major tobacco cigarette 
manufacturing companies in Zimbabwe, namely, British 
American Tobacco (BAT), Savanna Tobacco, and 
Gold Leaf, which sell mainly to South Africa (Hayson 
2019). The other four manufacturers are BRECO, 
CUTREG Processors, The Cigarette Company, and 
Chelsea Tobacco (Nhorido 2013). Eighty per cent of 
manufactured cigarettes are exported. Due to the 
lucrative tobacco market in South Africa, based on the 
size of the population, ‘Zimbabwe-produced cigarettes 
are smuggled into all its neighbouring countries, with 
the clear majority being smuggled into South Africa’ 
(Hayson 2019: 4). ‘Zimbabwe is reported to have lost 
billions of dollars through illegal trade. For example, 
South Africa is said to have lost R27 billion in tax 
revenue on the back of Zimbabwean tobacco illicit 
trade in the country between 2010 and 2016’ (Nkala 
2019). Illegal tobacco trade is also carried out in 
Botswana, Namibia, and Mozambique. In South Africa, 
as is the case for Zimbabwe, illicit tobacco trading has 
become central to political succession and interparty 
financing, it is therefore at the heart of power politics 
in both countries. Illicit tobacco trading involves some 
‘untouchables’ in the highest levels in the governments 
of both Zimbabwe and South Africa (Hayson 2019), 
through patronage networks and campaign funding. 
Thus, the illicit trade that begins with makoronyera in 
the farms and at auction floors leads to illegal cross 
border trading by ‘untouchables’ between Zimbabwe, 
as the biggest tobacco producer in Africa, and its 
neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa. The 
‘untouchables’ have the support of the ruling elites. 
The tendency for politicians and policy makers to 
allow groups of elites to emerge and benefit from their 
protection is common (Poulton and Chinsinga 2018). 
A similar pattern was observed in the Rift Valley in 
Kenya, where maize growers benefited, and in Mali and 
Burkina Faso, where cotton farmers took advantage of 
their political connections.
The informal marketing channels, which begin with 
makoronyera, lead to the illicit trade of tobacco 
through undesignated crossing points to Botswana, 
Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa. Thus, the 
crop is diverted at the farmgate and either delivered 
to contracting companies, or exported directly through 
illegal channels. These illegal channels constitute 
the understated shadow economy, argued to be 
at 60.6 per cent of gross domestic product by the 
International Monetary Fund (Medina and Schneider 
2018). BAT, which is involved in contract farming and 
the processing and manufacturing of tobacco and 
cigarettes, is reported to be leading the illicit tobacco 
trade into South Africa (Haydon 2019: 2). The Zimbabwe 
national economy and the farmers have lost enormous 
value due to this illicit trade, as this represents the 
perpetuation of primitive capital accumulation, where 
surplus value is extracted and exported to foster further 
development in developed countries.
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How has the COVID-19 pandemic reconfigured the 
tobacco and maize commodity circuits? The impact of 
COVID-19 on commodity circuits is evident in the input 
and output markets at national and local levels. The 
COVID-19 pandemic altered the maize and tobacco 
commodity circuits due to a combination of factors. 
COVID-19 regulations restricting farmers’ movements 
exacerbated the informality of crop marketing during 
the 2020 marketing season, aiding surplus value 
expropriation through primitive accumulation. This has 
mainly resulted in SHFs losing income. 
On 23 March 2020, the Zimbabwean government 
published laws which banned the gathering of more 
than 100 people, ordered the closure of borders and 
airports, and restricted movement except for identified 
critical services. In the commodity circuits, only the 
‘production supply, delivery or distribution of food (in 
particular supermarkets and food retail stores)’ were 
permitted to operate under Statutory Instrument 83 
of 2020. Disruptions to the transportation system 
and other logistics systems, including the closure 
of aggregation centres and warehouses, affected 
market access. The incidence of COVID-19 and the 
curtailment of movement imposed in response to 
the virus, resulted in the decline in daily deliveries of 
tobacco by independent farmers in 2020 (TIMB 2020).
5.1 Changes in Maize marketing 
patterns under COVID-19
In terms of maize marketing, Table 5.1 shows that 
under COVID-19 restrictions, local makoronyera were 
able to buy more maize at lower prices due to the lower 
prices offered by the GMB and the inability of outside 
buyers to travel to these areas to purchase maize. As 
a result, informal maize prices dropped from as high 
as US$7 per 20kg (bucket) to US$3 per bucket, when 
comparing the same period for 2019 and 2020. GMB 
maize deliveries have remained uninterrupted.13  Due to 
an acute maize shortage emanating from the low maize 
production in the previous season, the government 
opted to ensure that the GMB remained open to take 
13 Interview with GMB official in Harare, 6 July 2020
14 Interview with Mrs DN, Mvurwi, 2 February 2020
15 FGD at Madhidhidhi farm, 2 March 2020
maize deliveries from farmers. Most of the crop was 
grown under the Command Agriculture facility and it 
was therefore in the government’s interest to ensure 
deliveries were made before side-marketing could take 
place. Besides, it was also in the interests of policy 
makers, many of whom are involved in maize production, 
as they constitute the majority of the A2 farmers.
Maize trading in the informal sector also remained high 
as vulnerable growers facing cash shortages under 
the weight of COVID-19 were forced to sell at far lower 
prices and to fewer local makoronyera. Despite the 
GMB introducing incentives for early delivery, by March/
April of 2020, the public entity had collected 600t. This 
quantity of maize deliveries was similar to the 2019 
season, which was a drought year.14  While the GMB 
has been able to maintain deliveries to state approved 
processors, the informal sector has been hampered by 
travel restrictions, such that local buyers have not been 
able to transport the crop to areas outside Mazowe. 
This has exacerbated hunger challenges in Harare and 
other urban centres.
5.2 Changes in tobacco marketing 
patterns under COVID-19
Due to Covid-19, the start of the tobacco marketing 
period shifted from 20 March (the start date in 2019) to 
29 April 2020 (Chikwati 2020; Chikwati and Chasokela 
2019), thereby affecting revenue streams for farmers 
and other stakeholders along the commodity circuits. 
When the auction floors were opened, a litany of 
regulations were imposed. These changes resulted in 
farmers facing many challenges. For example, during 
an FGD,15 farmers in Mvurwi complained that they 
were facing the following challenges in marketing their 
tobacco crop:
• Some contract companies, which did not have 
direct contact with foreign buyers, ended up inviting 
other buyers to their auction floors. This results in 
lower prices to accommodate the fee payable to 
the contracting company. In such cases, farmers 
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receive low prices and might lose out, especially if 
they are not present during the auction.
• The use of a complex matrix in calculating the 
pricing leads to buyers manipulating the prices as 
farmers are not familiar with the system.
• The mixing of tobacco leaves of poor quality with 
good quality tobacco to lower the price. This is 
common where farmers are not present during the 
auction process.
• Disqualifying whole tobacco bales on the basis 
of only a few poor quality leaves that can be 
removed. This results in the need to regrade the 
tobacco and causes unnecessary additional costs 
or may result in an unexplained loss of weight. 
• Transporters are also accused of making changes 
to tobacco bales during transportation. 
• Delayed payments due to the use of incorrect 
details, which farmers are unable to immediately 
correct as they are not present during the sale.
• Farmers lack information as the representatives 
sent to the sale are not trained to deal with 
the emerging information. Besides, the 
representatives are only given five minutes to 
assess the sale after the process has been 
16 Interview with an independent farmer, GB, July 2020
concluded. This timeframe is inadequate for an 
effective assessment to be carried out. 
• Stop orders are also being placed for farmers’ 
without their consent. This results in deductions 
being made upon the sale of tobacco without the 
farmers’ knowledge.
• Some tobacco bales are getting lost and farmers 
are losing value due to their inability to effect timely 
follow-ups. 
• Deliberate exchange of price tags, which results in 
farmers being paid a lower value for the crop.
Summarising these changes and the impact thereof, a 
CA farmer16 underscored:
The travel restrictions imposed by the government 
because of Covid-19 stipulated that farmers with 
less than 100 bales of tobacco are not allowed 
on the auctioning floors. For us, as small farmers, 
we have to select one farmer to coordinate 
transportation and the logistics of selling at the 
auction floors. This practice is a disadvantage as 
farmers tend to lose influence over the price as they 
can neither negotiate nor withhold their bales. In 
the end, this will affect their revenue and thus our 
ability to reinvest in farm inputs declines. 
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C Weekly 200 bales 40 bales
1.60–4.50 2.30–5.0
• The price is not 
constant. 
• Logistical challenges 
and mistrust led to a 
decline in deliveries. 
• Absence of tobacco 
makoronyera at the 
auction floors led to 
reduced corruption and 
improved prices.
Monthly 800 bales 160 bales
D Weekly 14000kg 7000kg
2.80 3.50Monthly 56000kg 28000kg
Maize: makoronyera
E Weekly 2t 5t 
7.0/20kg 3.0/20kg
• Increases in local 
purchases because 
other makoronyera 
from other places are 
not able to move freely. 
• However, prices have 
dropped due to limited 
competition.
Monthly 8t 20t 
F Weekly 1t 5t 
5.0/20kg 3.0/20kg
Monthly 4t 20t
Source: Author’s own, APRA and CASA Study, 2020
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There were also further delays in the delivery of 
tobacco as some farmers avoided delivering their crop 
in anticipation that the COVID-19 travel restrictions 
would be relaxed sooner and enable them to attend 
the auction process.17 Deliveries were at 50 per cent 
of previous levels in week 53 of the 2020 marketing 
season, and they were hardly expected to reach 75 
per cent of anticipated levels by the end of the tobacco 
selling season (Table 5.1).
Some farmers suggest the decentralisation18 of the 
marketing system to smaller towns, where auction 
floors were established, made it difficult for companies 
to manipulate prices and for tobacco makoronyera 
in Harare to collude with buyers to manipulate the 
prices.19  It is, however, argued that some companies 
passed the cost of the decentralised auction system 
on to the farmers. Despite this, the limited corruption 
ultimately led to better prices for farmers.20
5.3 The supply of productive assets 
under COVID-19
The supply of goods from South Africa was also 
disrupted, even though formal agri-trading remained 
open across the borders. Initially, the supply was 
interrupted by the total closure of business in South 
Africa. However, this was later relaxed.21 By the time 
this relaxation took place, cross border procurement 
of goods was already facilitated illegally through 
17 Interview tobacco contracting company official, VS, July 2020
18 Decentralised auction systems entailed the setting up of auction floors in smaller towns in tobacco farming 
areas, such as Mvurwi, by contracting companies. The cost to set up a facility includes rental fees for space, 
additional labour costs, accommodation for the employees, and so on. The contracting companies are accused 
of pushing these costs on to the farmers through the manipulation of the pricing matrix.
19 Interview with Mrs DN, Mvurwi, 2 February 2020
20  Interview with Mrs DN, Mvurwi, 2 February 2020
21 Interview with agri-trader in Mvurwi, June 2020
undesignated points (Scoones 2020) akin to those 
used in illicit tobacco cigarette trading. This illegal route 
attracts higher operational costs due to rent-seeking 
and the bribes paid to security officers. Ultimately, 
these costs are passed on to the farmers and the 
consumers. As a result, the quantity of products sold 
by agri-traders was quartered between 2019 and 
2020, while selling prices increased by 50 per cent for 
productive assets and herbicides (Table 5.2).
The impact of these changes in supply prices are likely 
to be more evident during the next cropping season, 
as crop income changes begin to reflect a shift in input 
prices/supply and  to impact on production processes. 
This delayed impact will likely be significant, as farmers 
tend to rely on the reinvestment of farm income rather 
than financing from other sources (Scoones 2020; 
Shonhe 2019b; Moyo et al. 2014). For example, a 
decline in income would likely lead to decreased 
reinvestment in the cropping programme for the next 
season. The changes resulting from COVID-19 also 
include shortages of labour and closure of markets due 
to the limits to movement under COVID-19 restrictions. 
In some cases, contract farmers have been required to 
recruit state police and nurses at their own cost, which 
has increased their operational costs, eating into their 
profit margins. So, precisely who wins and who loses 
along the commodity circuits and to what effect? The 
next section assesses the social differentiation and 
social difference, in the shifting context of the GCCs.
Table 5.2: Changes in agro-trading under COVID-19
Agri - 
trader
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B Herbicides  Weekly 400l 100l 
US$6/ l US$9/l
Monthly 1600l 400l
Fertilisers Weekly 1000kg 400kg
US$25/50kg US$29/50kg
Monthly 4000kg 1600kg
Source: Author’s own, APRA and CASA Study, 2020
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In Mvurwi, access to land, agrarian finance, and 
markets is differentiated across gender and class. 
Differences and contestations over access to resources 
are fluid and depend on dynamic social relations, 
which produce social differentiation (Dancer and 
Hossain 2018; Berry 1993). This social differentiation 
is often deepened by commoditisation and economic 
liberalisation, which cause inequality and the exclusion 
of some social groups (Dancer and Hossain 2018; Hall, 
Scoones and Tsikata 2017). Politics and patronage 
connections also lead to social differentiation as rents 
are distributed unequally. This is noticeable along the 
commodity circuits for maize and tobacco, as in-depth 
interviews have revealed. Through inequality in the use 
of unpaid care work, carried out mostly by women, 
social difference is also noticeable. 
6.1 Gender relations
Access to Command Agriculture financing and private 
contract farming facilities is differentiated by gender, 
across the farming sectors. As Table 6.1 shows, 25 per 
cent of A2 women farmers participate in Command 
Agriculture, producing maize, while none have access 
to contract farming. In the A1 model, however, 20.7 per 
cent of women farmers are involved in private tobacco 
contract farming. In this model, tobacco contracting 
companies limit financing of tobacco production to 
1ha per person, as such, households tend to secure 
additional support by getting the wives to enter into a 
separate contract farming agreement. 
In the A2 model, where no such limitations exist, 
women have no access to contract farming. At least 
15.8 per cent of women in the CA have direct access 
to private contract farming. Unlike private contract 
farming, access to Command Agriculture is mediated 
by political patronage, as women occupy less influential 
positions, they tend to be excluded, unless they access 
the programme through their husbands. Instead, 
women are more involved in unpaid care work and 
domestic chores, including preparing food for casual 
and permanent farm workers for no pay. Women 
often have no involvement in key decision making, 
their inability to secure assets reflects unequal power 
dynamics associated with patriarchal tendencies. 
As intersectional theorists have observed, these 
tendencies reflect how exploitative and oppressive 
structures (Dancer and Hossain 2018), including the 
GCCs remain unfavourable to female farmers. As a 
result of differences in access to land and finance, as 
well as the unequal ability to mobilise labour, which 
is highly significant for tobacco production, women’s 
independent participation in maize and tobacco 
production is low. 
Table 6.2 shows that none of the A2 female farmers 
produced a tobacco crop of their own. The cropped 
area for tobacco and maize was also lower among the 
female A1 and CA farmers. A2 female farmers had a 
cropped area of 15ha, compared to 25.4ha among the 
male farmers, for maize and tobacco crops. This trend 
was also observed among the CA farmers, though the 
margin was lower.
A difference was also observed in the income earned 
by male and female farmers. Across the three farming 
models, female farmers earned less than their male 
counterparts. Even though female A1 farmers had 
an equal area of cropped land to male A1 farmers, 
their earnings were US$2,532.90, compared to 
US$4,389.30 for male farmers. Again, this translated 
to skewed asset accumulation, as Table 6.3 shows. 
Except in the A1 model, where male and female farmers 
have an average of 1.1 ox-ploughs and 0.5 tractors, 
male farmers own more farming assets and houses 
6 POLITICS AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION: 
WHO WINS AND LOSES?
Table 6.1: The percentage of women farmers accessing financing and marketing through the 
different farming models




Source: Author’s own, APRA survey, 2018–19
Sample: Mvurwi NA1=310; NCA=520; NA2=40
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than their female counterparts. Importantly, none of 
the female farmers across the farming models own 
generators. Generators are used to support irrigated 
crops and enable farmers to engage in horticulture, as 
well as year-round cropping programmes, enhancing 
their revenue earning potential. As such, the failure to 
access generators implies that women are not able to 
carry out irrigated cropping programmes of their own.
6.2 Generational and class differences
The level of youth involvement in the value chains was 
also analysed through the assessment of their access 
to Command Agriculture and contract farming. In 
terms of the tri-modal agrarian structure (Moyo 2011), 
the CA and A1 models represent the poor peasantry, 
while the A2 model is made up of middle-scale and 
large-scale farmers (rich capitalists).
Access to Command Agriculture and contract farming 
finance was higher among A2 farmers, compared 
to the other models/classes. For example, across all 
ages, access to Command Agriculture finance was 
high among A2 farmers (47.5 per cent), compared to 
A1 farmers (16.1 per cent) and CA farmers (2.7 per 
cent). Similarly, among the youth, 43.6 per cent of A2 
farmers had access to Command Agriculture finance, 
compared to 16.0 per cent and 5.0 per cent for A1 and 
CA farmers, respectively. The same trend is observed 
in contract farming, where the financing and marketing 
of tobacco is involved. 
The COVID-19 induced disruptions to the commodity 
circuits, experienced in the food-based and tobacco 
commercialisation pathways, will worsen inequity in 
income, capital accumulation, and social differentiation 
across farming sectors. Moreover, as women are the 
least entrusted to accompany bales to market floors by 
tobacco farmers, they tend to suffer more losses as the 
process is more prone to manipulation. For example, 
farmers complain of lost bales, delayed payment, and 
low prices. Some emerging farmer associations have 
been campaigning for better prices and full payment in 
foreign currency, as well as for increased government 
Table 6.2: Crop production by gender per farming model









A2 Male 25.4 13.4 2.1 104101.4
Female 15.0 11.5 0 96970.0
Grand total 24.3 13.2 1.9 103388.3
A1 Male 5.0 1.7 0.9 4389.3
Female 5.0 1.6 0.7 2532.9
Grand total 5.0 1.7 0.8 4019.0
CA Male 2.3 18.8 0.5 963.3
Female 1.8 0.5 0.4 372.4
Grand total 2.1 12.8 0.5 823.4
Source: Author’s own, APRA survey, 2018
Sample: Mvurwi NA1=310; NCA=520; NA2=40
Table 6.3: Average asset ownership by gender per farming model 
Sector Gender Ox-plough Scotch-
cart
Tractors Vehicles Generators Brick under 
asbestos 
houses
A2 Male 1.1 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.0
Female 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0 0.5
Grand total 1.1 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.0
A1 Male 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6
Female 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.1 0 0.7
Grand total 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6
CA Male 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9
Female .07 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9
Grand total 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.9
Source: Author’s own, APRA survey, 2018
Sample: Mvurwi NA1=310; NCA=520; NA2=40
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support. However, success has been slow, as their 
voices remain unheard.22 Thus, patterns of capital 
accumulation and social differentiation, evident along 
the commodity circuits, are derived from differentiated 
access to land and financing opportunities, which are 
tied to broad macro-economic policies and the politics 
of commodity circuits.
6.3 Labour relations
Another critical input is labour, with tobacco 
considered a labour intensive crop (Goger, Bamber, 
and Gareffi 2014: 9), a fact which makes tobacco 
farming an essential source of employment (Shonhe 
2019b). Consequently, labour is an essential 
consideration amongst inputs for the production of 
the crop. Sakata (2015) notes that under the contract 
farming arrangement, some contracting companies do 
support the farmer with money for labour while others 
do not. There is also a distinction in terms of the use of 
labour between different farm settlement models. The 
medium-scale and large commercial or capitalist farms 
rely almost exclusively on hired labour (Moyo 2013), 
while smallholder production is largely organised 
around family labour (Chambati 2013). Due to weak 
farmworker associations, most workers, especially 
women, are employed on a casual basis.
As mentioned, in the SHF class, there is a tendency to 
rely on family labour, which leads to the conversion of 
farmers into disguised workers, working for global capital 
(see Shonhe 2017), as was observed in Mvurwi. Within 
the context of a failing economy, where farmers lack the 
capacity to meet labour costs, farmworkers often have 
to wait for the marketing of the crop, and thus share the 
22 Interview with GMB official in Harare, 6 July 2020
risks of failing weather patterns and challenges with the 
farmers. This is a difficult arrangement for workers, who 
live from hand to mouth but are expected to defer their 
social reproduction needs.
6.4 Entangled accumulation, political 
settlement, and social difference
In all, the commodity circuits for maize and tobacco 
are tied to their financing models. Due to liquidity 
challenges in Zimbabwe, there are two primary 
financing models relied upon by farmers – Command 
Agriculture and private contract farming for maize 
and tobacco, respectively. However, there is a 
growing informalisation of the marketing channels 
– makoronyera – which undermines the contracting 
arrangements, but also attracts higher rewards for 
farmers in both circuits. COVID-19 has disrupted the 
production and circulation of agricultural commodities, 
affecting the pricing structure in the input and output 
markets. While prices improved for the tobacco crop 
compared to the 2019 farming season, primitive capital 
accumulation (Shonhe 2018; Shivji 2008) continues 
to undermine overall farmer accumulation, though 
differently, across farming models.
In the food-based commercialisation pathway, 
COVID-19 instigated changes have undermined farmer 
accumulation as prices have been depressed due to 
limited demand, since makoronyeras are unable to 
move freely to engage in farmgate purchases. While 
the GMB has introduced an early maize delivery 
incentive and relaxed moisture content requirements, 
prices remain low and unfavourable to farmers. Thus, 
Figure 6.1: Financing options for youth in Mvurwi area for 2016/17 season
Sample: Mvurwi NA1=310; NCA=520; NA2=40
Source: Author’s own, APRA study, 2017–21
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even though public procurement remains available, 
the prices are unstable and unviable. Through 
pillaging, associated with unfair pricing and illicit 
trading, entangled accumulation subsists across 
commercialisation pathways and along the GCCs for 
maize and tobacco crops. Overall, maize farmers are 
immensely affected by COVID-19, while makoronyera 
have benefited from the shifts in commodity circuits.
Tobacco farmers also experienced losses in income 
under the weight of COVID-19 regulations, despite the 
decentralisation of tobacco marketing. Farmers argue 
that tobacco merchants are manipulating purchasing 
prices to maximise their profits and cover the increased 
administration costs. Tobacco growers are less 
confident of the new marketing system as they were not 
allowed to participate at the auction floors, as was the 
case in previous years. In spite of this informalisation, 
the politics of commodity circuits and patronage remain 
essential for A2 farmers, who are accumulating from 
above, and less critical for A1 farmers, predominantly 
involved in accumulating from below.
6.5 Collapsing state regulations 
and the militarisation of agricultural 
financing
The illicit trade in maize and tobacco undermines 
agricultural commercialisation, with growers, whose 
voices are weak and fragmented, as the biggest 
losers amidst poor state regulation and monitoring. 
In contrast, the powerful GMAZ and the Zimbabwe 
Association of Tobacco Merchants command 
extensive policy influence. The general collapse of 
state regulatory systems has resulted in the input and 
output markets for both crops being characterised by 
illegal cross border trade, which is currently on the rise. 
This informal makoronyera circuit undermines contract 
farming arrangements and is a result of unfavourable 
state policies over time. It is also reflective of the more 
general state failure to enforce law and order across 
sectors, which has generated a growing sense of 
impunity in society.
The makoronyera are part of the shadow economy, 
which accounts for over 60.6 per cent of business 
in Zimbabwe. In the input markets, the commodity 
circuits are partially militarised as the security forces 
administering Command Agriculture wield excessive 
control, despite ongoing efforts towards privatisation. 
In essence, this militarisation has effectively replaced 
state institutions charged with enforcing policy and 
regulations. At the processing level, the GMAZ benefits 
from its proximity to political elites and the political 
power in the ruling party. This is synonymous with 
trends in other sectors, such as artisanal mining, 
where connected individuals also dominate. In 
essence, the increasing level of impunity, related to 
the overall collapse of government infrastructure, 
enables the flourishing of the makoronyera and state 
militarisation, which are now pervasive in all segments 
of the commodity circuits in Zimbabwe.
6.6 Entangled accumulation and the 
social relations of production
Global capitalism ensures that primitive accumulation 
is inherently embedded in agricultural GCCs. Contract 
farming arrangements are the new form of export 
financing, which exploit cheap labour and cheap raw 
materials in the periphery. Whether it is through the 
export of tobacco or the import of maize, illicit and unfair 
pricing – entangled accumulation – has been worsened 
by the incidence of COVID-19 and the restriction imposed 
in response to the pandemic. Patriarchal relations 
ensure that women are excluded from Command 
Agriculture and that only through circumventing the 
limitations of capitalism are women openly encouraged 
to access contract farming within farming households. 
Within the context of global capitalism, where primitive 
accumulation is the primary driver of expansion into 
the periphery and the social relations of production are 
influenced by patriarchal attitudes towards women, 
inequality and the exclusion of vulnerable groups is 
enhanced. Besides, the primacy of politics in Africa’s 
agricultural commercialisation pathways means that 
women who inherently occupy far lower positions of 
influence always come second best.
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This paper established that informal trading is a new normal, although it makes agricultural planning difficult and 
undermines farmer accumulation as it annihilates agribusiness confidence, and with it, prospects for furthering 
agricultural commercialisation. The introduction of new technologies, the decentralisation of tobacco marketing, 
and the reintroduction of producer prices for maize from the 2020/21 agricultural season provide scope for 
undercutting the role of makoronyera. However, this might also expand the scope for increased accumulation 
by farmers. The government's responsibility in eradicating impunity for corruption and providing an enabling 
macro-economic environment for sustainable commodity circuits cannot be over-emphasised. However, in the 
absence of a coherent voice from growers’, labour, and womens’ associations, it is the buyers and millers who 
have control over commodity markets, including illicit makoronyera trade, across border trading. The precarious 
conditions of growers, labour, women, and the youth is made worse by COVID-19, as the regulations imposed 
constrain their ability to accumulate.
7 CONCLUSION
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Interviews and focus group discussions
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Interview with a grain miller, VR, in Harare, May 2020
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Table A1 Population densities in oil palm growing areas
Region Area under cultivation (in 
per cent)
Population Density (no. of persons/sq km)
1984 2000 2010
Ashanti 10 86 148 196
Brong Ahafo 10 31 46 58
Central 16 116 162 224
Eastern 32 87 109 136
Volta 4 59 80 103
Western 28 48 80 99
Source: Author’s construct using data from the 2010 Population and Housing Census (GSS 2012)
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